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Abstract
On the domain of Choquet expected utility preferences with risk neutral lottery eval-
uation and totally monotone capacities, we demonstrate that proper scoring rules do
not exist. This implies the non-existence of proper scoring rules for any larger class of
preferences (CEU with convex capacities, multiple priors). We also show that if an agent
whose behavior conforms to the multiple priors model is faced with a scoring rule for a
subjective expected utility agent, she will always announce a probability belonging to her
set of priors; moreover, for any prior in the set, there exists such a scoring rule inducing
the agent to announce that prior.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: D81,C49
Key words: scoring rule, proper scoring rule, subjective expected utility, Choquet ex-
pected utility, multiple priors, implementation, probability elicitation
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1 Introduction
The primary purpose of this note is to determine whether a simple mechanism can be
designed whereby an agent facing subjective uncertainty is asked to reveal her “beliefs”
about the uncertainty, and it is strictly incentive compatible for her to do so. Our
primary ﬁnding is that if the possible “beliefs” that the agent may possess belong to a
certain class, the answer is no.
Consider an environment with an exogenous set of states of the world. In classi-
cal models of subjective expected utility, agents make choices between acts, or state-
contingent outcomes. Savage [16] establishes that an agent whose behavior conforms
with several intuitive axioms acts as if she behaves in an expected utility fashion. For
such a decision maker, there exists a unique probability measure over the states of the
world, and a utility function over money. The decision maker always makes choices over
acts in order to maximize her expected utility. In theory, this unique probability measure
can be recovered by observing all possible choices between pairs of acts. While Savage’s
theory requires an inﬁnite set of states of the world, other theories, most notably that of
Anscombe and Aumann [2], do not.
Suppose that the agent in question is risk-neutral, so that her utility index over
monetary payoﬀs is aﬃne (we will see that this is without loss of generality). For such
an agent, it is not necessary to observe all possible choices between all pairs of acts in
order to elicit the unique probability measure representing beliefs. In fact, it is enough
to oﬀer such a decision maker one choice over a menu of acts, an insight originally due
to Brier [4]. Optimizing behavior of the decision maker reveals her probability measure.
Such a menu of acts is referred to as a scoring rule. A scoring rule is proper if the unique
optimizing choice is to reveal her probability measure. The theory of scoring rules can
easily be viewed as a subset of the implementation literature (surveyed, for example, by
Jackson [13])–a scoring rule is a single-agent mechanism whereby it is always a strictly
dominant strategy for an agent to reveal her true preference.
∗I would like to thank Federico Echenique, PJ Healy, and John Ledyard for useful comments and
suggestions. All errors are my own.
Importantly, the theory of scoring rules meshes well with the “as if” approach of
classical decision theory. The probability measure corresponding to a subjective expected
utility agent is merely part of the representation of preference; however, it is uniquely
deﬁned. This is no problem for the theory of scoring rules–an agent is only required to
make a choice from among a menu of acts ; there need not be any mention of the word
“probability” by whoever oﬀers this menu to the agent.
While Brier provides the ﬁrst example of a proper scoring rule, McCarthy [14] (see
also Savage [17]) fully characterizes the proper scoring rules. Scoring rules are commonly
used in the experimental literature to elicit probabilities, starting with the original work
of McKelvey and Page [15]. Camerer [5] (p. 592-593) discusses the use of scoring rules
in experimental economics. The most important point from the perspective of this note
is that proper scoring rules exist in subjective expected utility environments.
The preceding results all operate under the presumption that a given agent’s behavior
conforms to the subjective expected utility axioms. Of course, the subjective expected
utility paradigm is not universal. Ellsberg [7] demonstrates this, and it is at this point
taken as given in the decision theory literature that the behavior of many agents does not
conform to either the Savage or Anscombe and Aumann axioms. Informally speaking,
there may be uncertainty about probabilities of certain events. Such uncertainty is
referred to in the literature as “ambiguity.”1 A well-known model due to Schmeidler
[18], the Choquet expected utility model, is able to accommodate this type of behavior.
An agent whose behavior conforms to the Choquet expected utility model also has a
unique set function representing beliefs; however, this function is not necessarily additive
(we often refer to this unique set function as the “beliefs” of an agent). Thus, the model
is more general than the subjective expected utility model. Another important model
that can accommodate Ellsberg-type behavior is the multiple priors model, axiomatized
by Gilboa and Schmeidler [12]. This model features an agent who can be viewed as
possessing a set of priors. Such an agent evaluates the utility of an act by taking the
minimal expected utility of the act across all priors in her set.
Ultimately, one would like to design a scoring rule allowing an agent to express beliefs
reﬂecting subjectively ambiguous situations. Unfortunately, our ﬁrst primary result is
that there exists no analogue of a proper scoring rule for these more general decision
models. We demonstrate this impossibility on the smallest well-known extension of the
subjective expected utility paradigm. The particular extension under consideration is
compatible with the Choquet expected utility model; but it additionally requires that
the set function representing beliefs is totally monotone. This gives a broad-ranging
impossibility result for non-expected utility models. Indeed, the result establishes that
the existence of proper scoring rules for subjective expected utility models is knife-edge.
Given the impossibility, we attempt to understand how an agent whose behavior does
not conform to the subjective expected utility paradigm might act if she faces a proper
1General theories of ambiguity are found in the works of Epstein [8], Epstein and Zhang [9], and
Ghirardato and Marinacci [10].
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scoring rule that is designed to elicit the beliefs of a subjective expected utility agent. For
this environment, we consider an agent whose behavior conforms with the multiple priors
model.2 Suppose that she is oﬀered a proper scoring rule that could be used to elicit
the probability measure of a subjective expected utility agent. Our second main result
shows that she will choose an act corresponding to some probability measure in her set
of priors. The main result shows exactly how to ﬁnd which of these acts she will choose.
Moreover, for every probability in her set of priors, there exists some proper scoring rule
for which it is optimal for her to choose the act corresponding to the probability. To
establish these results, we determine a dual optimization problem that the agent may
equivalently perform.
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 discusses our primary results. Section 4
concludes.
2 The model
Let Ω be a ﬁnite set of states of the world. An act is a function x : Ω → R. The set
of acts is denoted F . A capacity is a function ν : 2Ω → R which is monotonic (i.e. for
all E,F ⊂ Ω, if E ⊂ F , then ν (E) ≤ ν (F )), and is normalized so that ν (∅) = 0, and
ν (Ω) = 1. A capacity is totally monotone if for all {E1, ..., En} ⊂ 2Ω,
ν
(
n⋃
j=1
Ej
)
≥
∑
J⊂{1,...,n}
(−1)|J|+1 ν
(⋂
j∈J
Ej
)
.
A capacity is convex if for all A,B ∈ 2Ω,
ν (A) + ν (B) ≤ ν (A ∩B) + ν (A ∪B) .
For all E ⊂ Ω, E 	= ∅, deﬁne νE (F ) =
{
1 if E ⊂ F
0 otherwise
. A classical representation
theorem, due to Dempster, Shafer, and Shapley (see Shapley [19], for example), states
that ν is a capacity if and only if for all E ⊂ Ω, there exists α (ν, E) ∈ R for which∑
E =∅α (ν, E) = 1 such that ν =
∑
E α (ν, E) νE . Further, ν is totally monotone if and
only if α (ν, E) ≥ 0 for all E (Choquet [6], Chapter VII, has a more general theorem
which predates the work of Shapley). Totally monotone capacities form the convex hull
of {νE}E⊂2Ω\∅. Denote the set of totally monotone capacities on Ω by TM (Ω) and
denote the set of probability measures on Ω by ∆ (Ω).
2While the multiple priors model does not generalize the Choquet expected utility model, it is a
generalization of the Choquet expected utility model under the additional assumption that decision
makers are uncertainty averse, as deﬁned by Schmeidler [18], (see p. 582-583, especially parts (ix) and
(x) of the Proposition).
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All probability measures are totally monotone capacities and all totally monotone
capacities are convex. A capacity is a probability measure if and only if the corresponding
α assigns positive value only to singletons.
A risk-neutral Choquet expected utility maximizer evaluates acts x : Ω→ R through
the use of the Choquet integral 3:
Eν [x] =
∫
Ω
x (ω) dν (ω) .
The Choquet integral is deﬁned as follows: for all ν, let {α (ν, E)}E be its associated list
of weights. Then
Eν [x] =
∑
E∈2Ω\∅
min
ω∈E
{x (ω)}α (ν, E) .
Preferences conforming to the Choquet expected utility model were introduced and ax-
iomatized by Schmeidler [18].
Let C be some set of capacities. A scoring rule on C is a function f : C → F for
which for all ν, ν ′ ∈ C,
Eν [f (ν)] ≥ Eν [f (ν ′)] .
Obviously, scoring rules exist; simply ﬁx x ∈ F , and let f (ν) ≡ x for all ν ∈ C. A scoring
rule is proper4 if for all ν, ν ′ ∈ C for which ν 	= ν ′, Eν [f (ν)] > Eν [f (ν ′)]. An agent
facing a proper scoring rule acts in her best interest (in an ex-ante sense) by choosing
the act corresponding to her capacity.
3 Results
3.1 The nonexistence of proper scoring rules
The following result is due to McCarthy [14], Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (McCarthy): The function f : ∆ (Ω) → F is a proper scoring rule on
∆ (Ω) if and only if there exists some strictly convex function g : ∆ (Ω) → R for
which for all ν ∈ ∆(Ω), the function hν : ∆ (Ω)→ R deﬁned by hν (ν ′) ≡ Eν′ [f (ν)]
is contained in the subdiﬀerential of g at ν.5
3Note that we require our decision-maker to be risk-neutral. This is also a feature of the pioneering
work of Brier [4], McCarthy [14], and Savage [17]. However, the key feature of risk-neutrality is that the
decision maker has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index which is linear. If one accepts the theory
of Anscombe and Aumann [2], then decision makers need not be risk-neutral, and one can use lotteries
as payoﬀs. Instead of monetary compensation, state-contingent payoﬀs would be in the probability
of winning some alternative. This idea is ﬁrst introduced in Allen [1]. The only diﬀerence is the
requirement that probabilities must be bounded. However, any monetary proper scoring rule will also
necessarily be bounded, at least in the subjective expected utility model.
4Sometimes, such a scoring rule is referred to as strictly proper.
5Formally speaking, g ≥ hν , and g (ν) = hν (ν).
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Proof (sketch): It is simple to verify that such a function g induces a proper scoring
rule on ∆ (Ω). Conversely, suppose that f is a proper scoring rule on ∆ (Ω). Deﬁne
g : ∆ (Ω) → R as g (ν) = supν′ hν′ (ν). As the supremum of convex functions, g is also
convex. Moreover, as f is a proper scoring rule, we know that g (ν) = maxν′ hν′ (ν),
and moreover, the maximum is achieved uniquely at ν ′ = ν. Thus, g is in fact strictly
convex. In other words, the linear functional hν is included in the subdiﬀerential of g at
ν, but is included in no other subdiﬀerential. 
The preceding characterization illustrates that the set of proper scoring rules on ∆ (Ω)
is quite large. When considering more general decision models; however, the situation
is dramatically diﬀerent. We will show that there does not exist a proper scoring rule
on TM (Ω). This implies a corresponding result for any superset of TM (Ω), as well as
other related models. Note that this impossibility result does not imply that the function
representing beliefs cannot be elicited. It merely implies that it cannot be elicited from
a single choice. An interesting question is to understand which families of beliefs can be
elicited from a ﬁnite (possibly sequential) number of choices.
The intuition for the result is simple. By the Dempster, Shafer, Shapley represen-
tation, the set TM (Ω) is isomorphic to ∆ (2Ω\∅). Hence the set TM (Ω) is of an
exponentially higher dimension that the set ∆ (Ω). The set of acts has a higher dimen-
sion than ∆ (Ω) (as ∆ (Ω) is simply a simplex in RΩ, and RΩ is the same as F). However,
as soon as there is more than one state of the world, the set TM (Ω) has a higher dimen-
sion than F . It therefore becomes more diﬃcult to use acts in F to distinguish between
decision makers with diﬀering capacities.
Theorem 2: If |Ω| > 1, there does not exist a proper scoring rule on the domain
TM (Ω).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may work with the Dempster, Shafer, and
Shapley representation of totally monotone capacities. A scoring rule then maps from
∆
(
2Ω\∅) into F . If α, β ∈ ∆ (2Ω\∅) and α 	= β, by properness,∑
E∈2Ω\∅
min
ω∈E
{f (α) (ω)}α (E) >
∑
E∈2Ω\∅
min
ω∈E
{f (β) (ω)}α (E) .
As the payoﬀ from telling the truth is U (α) =
∑
E∈2Ω\∅minω∈E {f (α) (ω)}α (E), the
function
U (α) = sup
β∈∆(2Ω\∅)
∑
E∈2Ω\∅
min
ω∈E
{f (β) (ω)}α (E)
is a supremum of linear functionals, and must be strictly convex.
We will show that it is impossible for U to be strictly convex. Let W (Ω) be the set
of weak orders on Ω.6 We will say an act x : Ω → R is monotonic with respect to
∈ W (Ω) if x (ω) ≥ x (ω′)⇔ ω  ω′. Note that W (Ω) is a ﬁnite set.
6An order  is a weak order if it is complete and transitive.
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For all acts x ∈ F , there exists an order  with respect to which x is monotonic.
Note that if x is monotonic with respect to , then
∑
E∈2Ω\∅
min
ω∈E
{x (ω)}α (E) =
∑
E∈2Ω\∅
x
(
arg min
ω∈E

)
α (E) .
Denote by x () the set of acts that are monotonic with respect to .
For all  for which x () ∩ f (TM (Ω)) is nonempty, deﬁne U (α) =
supx∈x()∩f(TM(Ω))
∑
E∈2Ω\∅ x (argminω∈E )α (E). Note that each such U is convex
and subdiﬀerentiable on the boundary of ∆
(
2Ω\∅).
We claim that for all V open in ∆
(
2Ω\∅) and convex, there exists α, β ∈ V , α 	= β,
and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that U (α) = U (β) = U (λα + (1− λ) β), so that U is not
strictly convex. Let ω∗ ≡ arg minω∈Ω , and consider any E 	= {ω∗} which contains ω∗.
Then in particular, arg minω∈E = ω∗ and arg minω∈{ω∗} = ω∗. As V is open, there
exists α ∈ V for which α ({ω∗}) > 0. Let ε < α ({ω∗}) be small enough so that
β (F ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
α (F )− ε if F = {ω∗}
α (F ) + ε if F = E
α (F ) otherwise
⎫⎬
⎭
is contained in V (as V is open, such an ε exists). As for all F /∈ {{ω∗} , E}, β (F ) =
α (F ), it is clear that
sup
x∈x()∩f(TM(Ω))
∑
E∈2Ω\∅
x
(
arg min
ω∈E

)
α (E)
= sup
x∈x()∩f(TM(Ω))
∑
E∈2Ω\∅
x
(
arg min
ω∈E

)
β (E) .
Moreover, it is also clear that for any λ ∈ (0, 1),
sup
x∈x()∩f(TM(Ω))
∑
E∈2Ω\∅
x
(
arg min
ω∈E

)
α (E)
= sup
x∈x()∩f(TM(Ω))
∑
E∈2Ω\∅
x
(
arg min
ω∈E

)
(λα + (1− λ)β) (E) .
Therefore, U is not strictly convex on any open neighborhood V .
Clearly, U = sup U
. We claim that there exists some open V and some
 for which U |V = U|V . The theorem will then be complete, as U is not
strictly convex on V . Enumerate the functions
{
U
}
as
{
U1, ..., UK
}
. Clearly,
∆
(
2Ω\∅) is relatively open. Set V 1 = ∆ (2Ω\∅). For all i = 2, ..., K, set
V i = {α ∈ V i−1 : there exists j such that U j (α) > U i−1 (α)}. Set V K+1 = ∅. Clearly,
V i is open for all i, and for all i = 1, ...K, V i ⊂ V i−1. Let i∗ satisfy V i∗ 	= ∅ and
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V i
∗+1 = ∅ (clearly such an i∗ must exist). As V i
∗+1 = ∅, it must be that U i
∗
(α) ≥ U i (α)
for all i on V i
∗
. We therefore establish that there exists some open set V for which there
exists ∗ for which U = U∗ . This is an immediate contradiction to the strict convexity
of U . Therefore, there exists no proper scoring rule on TM (Ω). 
Corollary 1: For all C for which TM (Ω) ⊂ C, there does not exist a proper scoring
rule on C.
The preceding corollary applies especially to the case of those individuals who evaluate
acts with respect to convex capacities (as all totally monotone capacities are convex). It
also applies to the general model of biseparable preferences of Ghirardato and Marinacci
[11]. We will now discuss a related model for which an impossibility is obtained.
Say a preference ordering is a multiple priors ordering if there exists a nonempty,
closed, convex set P ⊂ ∆(Ω) such that the decision maker evaluates actions x accord-
ing to minp∈P Ep [x]. Multiple priors preferences were ﬁrst axiomatized by Gilboa and
Schmeidler [12].
We may deﬁne another notion of a scoring rule; one in which agents announce sets of
priors. Denote by K (∆ (Ω)) the nonempty, compact, convex subsets of ∆ (Ω).
Corollary 2: There does not exist a function f : K (∆ (Ω)) → F for which for all
P, P ′ ∈ K (∆ (Ω)) with P 	= P ′
min
p∈P
Ep [f (P )] > min
p∈P
Ep [f (P
′)] .
Proof. For all ν ∈ TM (Ω), let C (ν) = {p ∈ ∆(Ω) : p (E) ≥ ν (E) for all E ⊂ Ω}.
A classic result of Schmeidler (for example, see Schmeidler [18], p. 582-583) states that
for all E ⊂ Ω, ν (E) = min {p (E) : p ∈ C (ν)}, and moreover, Eν [x] = minp∈C(ν) Ep [x]
for all x ∈ F . The corollary now follows trivially. 
3.2 Choices made by agents facing scoring rules on ∆(Ω)
The question addressed here is the following. Let f be a scoring rule on ∆ (Ω), and let
P ⊂ ∆(Ω) be closed and convex. For which p∗ is it true that
min
p∈P
Ep [f (p
∗)] ≥ min
p∈P
Ep [f (p
′)]
for all p′ ∈ ∆(Ω)? When a multiple priors decision maker is faced with a scoring rule
on ∆ (Ω), which probability measure can we expect her to reveal?
One important question is the general existence of a solution to the optimization
problem. The following example demonstrates that existence is not guaranteed.
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Example: Given a proper scoring rule on ∆ (Ω), say, f , and a set of priors P ⊂ ∆(Ω),
there need not exist a solution to the optimization problem
max
p∗∈∆(Ω)
min
p∈P
Ep [f (p
∗)] .
To see this, let Ω = {0, 1} and let P = ∆(Ω). Without loss of generality, we
may identify ∆ (Ω) with [0, 1], so that a decision maker is required to announce
the probability of {1}. By Theorem 1, a scoring rule on ∆ (Ω) is identiﬁed with a
subdiﬀerential mapping of a strictly convex function g : [0, 1] → R. Consider the
function g deﬁned by:
g (x) ≡
{
(2x− 1)2 if x < 1/2
2 (2x + 1) (2x− 1) if x ≥ 1/2 .
Note that g is smooth everywhere except for its boundaries, and at the point 1/2.
Therefore, when choosing a scoring rule on ∆ (Ω), we are free to pick any element
of the subdiﬀerential at 1/2. We may therefore choose the following scoring rule:
for p < 1/2,
f (p) (0) = −4p2 + 1
f (p) (1) = −4p2 + 8p− 3,
and for p ≥ 1/2,
f (p) (0) = −2− 8p2
f (p) (1) = 16p− 2− 8p2.
Therefore, for p < 1/2, minp′∈∆(Ω) Ep′ [f (p)] = −4p2 + 8p − 3, and for p ≥ 1/2,
minp′∈∆(Ω) Ep′ [f (p)] = −2− 8p2. It is easy to see that a maximum does not exist
in this case. Note, however, that supp∈∆(Ω) minp′∈∆(Ω) Ep′ [f (p)] = 0, and can be
achieved by taking a sequence {pn} such that pn = 1/2 − εn, where εn > 0 and
εn → 0. Thus, the supremum is achieved in a neighborhood of 1/2, which is the
minimizer of g. We will see that the minimizer of g over a compact set of priors
will be the typical choice for a multiple priors decision maker facing a scoring rule
on ∆ (Ω).
Note the feature of the preceding example: the scoring rule f is discontinuous at
the point p = 1/2. This is because there is a “kink” in the function g from which f
is deﬁned. To this end, we are concerned primarily with continuous scoring rules on
∆ (Ω); those are the scoring rules for which the corresponding function from Theorem 1
g : ∆ (Ω)→ R is everywhere diﬀerentiable.
Theorem 3: Let f be a continuous proper scoring rule on ∆ (Ω) and let P be convex
and compact. Then argmaxp∗∈∆(Ω) minp∈P Ep [f (p∗)] exists, is a singleton, and is
equal to arg minp∗∈P maxp∈∆(Ω) Ep∗ [f (p)]. In particular, the unique solution to the
optimization problem is an element of P . Furthermore, for all p ∈ P , there exists
a continuous probabilistic scoring rule whose corresponding solution is p.
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Proof. Existence of a solution follows trivially from continuity and compactness of
∆ (Ω). The remainder of the proof is an application of the minimax theorem. Deﬁne
X to be the convex hull of {f (p)}p∈∆(Ω). As x is continuous in p and as ∆ (Ω) is
compact, the set {f (p)}p∈∆(Ω) is compact, thus X is compact (as Ω is ﬁnite). Consider
the function G : ∆ (Ω)×X → R deﬁned by
G (p, x) = Ep [x] .
This function is clearly bilinear. Moreover, by the Sion minimax Theorem (Berge [3], p.
210), there exist p∗ ∈ P and x∗ ∈ X such that for all (p, x) ∈ P ×X,
Ep∗ [x] ≤ Ep∗ [x∗] ≤ Ep [x∗] .
In particular, for given p∗, the unique maximizer of Ep∗ [x] over X is f (p∗), so that the
inequality reads:
Ep∗ [x] ≤ Ep∗ [f (p∗)] ≤ Ep [f (p∗)] .
Moreover, we therefore may write
Ep∗ [f (p)] ≤ Ep∗ [f (p∗)] ≤ Ep [f (p∗)] ,
for all p 	= p∗. Hence,
min
p∈P
max
p′∈∆(Ω)
Ep [f (p
′)] = max
p′∈∆(Ω)
min
p∈P
Ep [f (p
′)] ,
and is achieved at p = p∗, p′ = p∗. We claim that p∗ is the unique element of
arg minp∈P maxp′∈∆(Ω) Ep [f (p′)]; this follows trivially by the strict convexity of g (p′) =
maxp′∈∆(Ω) Ep [f (p′)] and the fact that P is convex and compact. Moreover, p∗ is also the
unique element of arg maxp′∈∆(Ω) minp∈P Ep [f (p′)]. To see this, let p′ ∈ ∆(Ω), p′ 	= p∗.
Then
min
p∈P
Ep [f (p
′)]
≤ Ep∗ [f (p′)]
< Ep∗ [f (p
∗)]
= max
p′′∈∆(Ω)
min
p∈P
Ep [f (p
′′)] .
Here, the ﬁrst inequality follows as p∗ ∈ P and the second follows as f is a proper scoring
rule on ∆ (Ω). Hence, maxp′∈∆(Ω) minp∈P Ep [f (p′)] is achieved (uniquely) at p∗ ∈ P ,
which is the unique minimizer of the strictly convex function g (p′) = maxp′∈∆(Ω) Ep [f (p′)]
over P .
To see that for all p∗ ∈ P , there exists a continuous probabilistic scoring rule for
which arg maxp∈∆(Ω) minp∗∈P Ep∗ [f (p)] = {p∗}, simply let g be a strictly convex and
smooth function g : ∆ (Ω) → R whose global minimum is achieved at p∗ (for example,
let g (p) ≡ ‖p− p∗‖2, where ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm). Let x : ∆ (Ω)→ R be the
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continuous probabilistic scoring rule which consists of the subdiﬀerentials of g. Then
g (p′) = maxp∈∆(Ω) Ep′ [f (p)], from which we utilize our preceding result. 
Suppose there are only two states of the world, say Ω = {1, 2}. In such an environ-
ment, a multiple priors agent is characterized by the maximal and minimal probabilities
she attributes to one of the states. These maximal and minimal probabilities can be
completely recovered by using two distinct scoring rules on ∆ (Ω). The ﬁrst such scoring
rule, say f1, has a corresponding function g1 from Theorem 1 which is minimized uniquely
at the probability measure placing probability one on state 1. The second scoring rule,
f2, has a corresponding function g2 from Theorem 1 which is minimized uniquely at the
probability measure placing probability one on state 2.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that proper scoring rules do not exist for agents whose behavior is not
consistent with the subjective expected utility paradigm. However; this does not preclude
the existence of simple methods of determining a multiple priors agent’s set of priors,
for example. It only demonstrates the impossibility of eliciting this set of priors using a
single decision. For example, we have shown how, in a two-state environment, one may
elicit the set of priors using only two menus of acts. An interesting question, therefore,
is to ﬁnd a minimal collection of menus that an agent must face in order to completely
determine her set of priors in a more general enviornment.
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